

KEYNOTE ADDRESSES
FROM THE *MANAGING CHAOS* CONFERENCE

LES ASPIN

Challenges to Values-Based Military Intervention

TED KOPPEL

The Global Information Revolution and TV News

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
THE
MANAGING
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KEYNOTE
ADDRESSES

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HIGHLIGHTS

LES ASPIN

Challenges to Values-Based Military Intervention

The United States has traditionally justified its military interventions by appealing to two priorities: national security and national interests. In the post-Cold War world, the United States is increasingly confronted with military intervention scenarios that serve a new and different priority—protecting the values of the United States.

The use of military forces to protect or further American values is different from military action to protect national security or national interests in the following ways:

- Value interventions often require involvement in the internal affairs of other countries. This kind of military intervention is much more complicated than dealing with aggression across borders.
- Support for value interventions is difficult to gauge or predict. People who are generally hawks or doves regarding national security and national interest interventions take unpredictable positions on value interventions.

Protecting American values opens up a much wider array of potential conflicts than protecting national security or interests. And value interventions raise difficult questions about why the United States intervened in one situation but not another.

- The “CNN factor” greatly influences value interventions. Television has a much more significant impact on the decision to intervene in value cases than in interest or security cases.
- People change their minds more readily in value cases than in interest or security cases. Emotion often leads people to support value intervention, but the costs in resources and lives can—and did in Somalia—quickly turn the tide against U.S. intervention.
- The intelligence community has a difficult time identifying and keeping track of value cases, because they are less well defined than national security and interest cases and can crop up anywhere.

The most difficult challenge for the military in a values intervention is the dichotomy between being a soldier and being a policeman. The two roles require completely different mindsets for the people carrying them out. “If you’re kicking down a door and rushing into a room, do you go in there with guns blazing or do you go in there and read them their rights? That’s the fundamental philosophical difference between the police work and military work. They are different cultures.”

“There is a three-to-one manpower ratio involved in doing a peacekeeping job.” You need to train one set of troops to be peacekeepers, have them serve as peacekeepers, and then retrain them to be soldiers. You must rotate three times the number of soldiers required to actually perform the peacekeeping function because of the need to train and retrain them for the particular challenges of a peacekeeping mission.

“There is a battle going on in this country between two schools of thought: those who argue that we should send people into value agenda situations and those who argue that we should not.”



Things go wrong in values agenda cases for three reasons:

- Failure to understand the mission, or changing the mission once troops are sent in.
- Underestimation of the enemy, problem, or domestic opposition.
- Failure to think through an exit strategy at the start.

TED KOPPEL
The Global Information Revolution and TV News

The media in the United States—and the world—conduct themselves primarily on the basis of the First Amendment right to free speech and a free press. Anyone can be a journalist. There is no requirement or license, and no individual or organization regulates or controls the media. “There has been . . . a democratization of media.” Anyone with access to a computer, tape recorder, or video camera can be a journalist.

“The fact that media, capable of conveying great quantities of information to large numbers of people in distant locations, are now in the hands of the general public, redefines—if you think about it—the nature of the mass media.”

“It is . . . far easier for Saddam Hussein, for example, to reach a wide audience in the United States with his own spin on events, than for the U.S. government to do the same in Iraq.”

U.S. foreign policy is affected by the imperative of shaping perceptions on the domestic front. The flood of images and words from the media forces policymakers to spend much of their time attempting to frame and interpret events and policies to the satisfaction of the American people.

“Simple pictures can, and do, have enormous consequences for American foreign policy. Scenes of starving children in Somalia clearly helped precipitate our involvement in that country, just as scenes

of that dead Ranger being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu speeded up the timetable for our withdrawal.”

“Increasingly, information is being gathered and disseminated by more people and in a more chaotic fashion than ever before; and, coincidentally or not, it is happening at a time when the conduct of U.S. foreign policy itself is being subjected to its own chaos theory.”

“While there is no discernible reason for growing nostalgic over the absence of the Cold War, there is every reason to be alarmed about the inability of our leaders to focus clearly on where our national interests now lie.”

There is a vacuum of foreign policy leadership at present, and the media appear to be filling that vacuum with random images that spark public outcry and evoke a response. At present, there is nothing else to guide U.S. foreign policy aside from these images and sound bites.

“We process information in this country the way we eat: on the run, without adequate time for digestion. McThought! Fast food and fast thought fulfill a need for instant gratification, but neither is quite as nourishing as when the product is prepared with care and consumed in a more leisurely fashion.”

Three factors now determine to a significant extent the way the media cover events: time, money, and technology. Immediate news is now essential, because deadlines are at the end of the hour instead of the end of the day. Money concerns have shrunk the number of costly foreign correspondents and have produced intense, but relatively short-lived, coverage of foreign policy stories. Technology has given us the ability to transmit events as they are happening, leading to reduced time for reflection and careful thought and a lack of context in most reporting.

The result of immediate, real-time coverage of events is an expectation of an immediate response from policymakers. Taking time is not perceived as caution and thoughtfulness, but rather as incompetence and indecisiveness. “If we are to avoid



sliding into information anarchy, the executive branch of government, in particular, will have to exercise genuine leadership.”

“You cannot and should not expect the media to take the lead in determining how or whether the national interest is served by the continued existence of NATO, or by unilateral U.S. intervention in Bosnia.” Now more than ever, this leadership is the responsibility of the executive branch.

PREFACE

On November 30 and December 1, 1994, the United States Institute of Peace celebrated the tenth anniversary of its establishment by Congress with a major conference entitled "Managing Chaos: Coping with International Conflict into the 21st Century." This conference, which was diverse both in the range of topics explored and in the talent it brought to bear on them, assessed the sources of international conflict that will challenge the United States and the world in the coming decades, and the means, both traditional and new, for dealing with them.

Seven sessions provided stimulating discussions about the changing character of international conflict, the new institutions of conflict resolution, and the new diplomacy and tools for conflict management (see the conference agenda on page 17). While the conference focused on the most important foreign affairs debates of our time, it gave special attention to the changing—and growing—role of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in managing international conflict. The leadership of the American humanitarian, advocacy, and conflict resolution NGOs was in attendance, as were the government and international organization officials who work with them.

More than 1,200 people—policymakers, U.S. and foreign diplomats, academics, representatives of

international and regional organizations, managers and staff members of NGOs, and lay persons of every description—listened to and entered into dialogue with 50 session speakers. These numbers testify to the importance of the topics addressed and to the Institute's ability to convene a highly diverse audience. Coverage of the conference has been widespread, from BBC, C-SPAN, and Worldnet to national and regional newspapers.

The Aspin and Koppel Keynote Addresses


In addition to an outstanding assemblage of high-level national and international talent, the conference was blessed with several exceptionally fine keynote addresses that touched on and expanded key themes.

Former secretary of defense and congressman Les Aspin spoke at the luncheon on November 30 on "Challenges to Values-Based Military Intervention." His remarks effectively complemented the discussions by humanitarian NGO speakers and the policy-related session on "The Future of Intervention in Violent Internal Conflicts."

ABC News anchor and managing editor Ted Koppel, in a speech on "The Global Information Revolution and TV News," spoke at the luncheon on December 1 on the opportunities and problems caused by the advancing reach and accessibility of international media. His remarks resonated well with the many speakers who addressed both sources of conflict and their management, and added a vital dimension to the debate over the challenges of the next several decades.

In this volume, we have transcribed and edited the remarks of these two keynote speakers to meet what has become a very considerable public demand for their presentations. We are grateful to Secretary Aspin and Mr. Koppel, as well as to their staffs, for helping us make their thoughtful remarks more widely available.

RICHARD H. SOLOMON
PRESIDENT



LES ASPIN

Challenges to Values-Based Military Intervention



Using the military as a means of managing chaos is an important topic, because if we are managing chaos—coping with international conflict into the twenty-first century—sooner or later somebody will come around to the view that we ought to use the military to manage that chaos.

All you have to do is look at the debates over the issues that have been in the headlines—Bosnia, Haiti, Somalia, Rwanda. Bosnia, of course, coming up and disappearing; Haiti, Rwanda, Somalia, coming up and disappearing. No doubt there are others, and we're going to be dealing with more in the future. So the question—an important question for this conference—is to try to help the country think through the issue of where we *do* use U.S. military assets and where we *do not* use U.S. military assets. I'd like to make a stab at that today.

Let me begin by saying that in the post-Cold War world we have a new set of circumstances that might call for military intervention. Previously, we had two such sets; now we have three. The three things that we might use military force to protect are, first of all, our security; second, our interests; and third, our values.

The need to protect our security has, of course, always been there during the Cold War and is there now: it is the primary reason why any country maintains armed forces. Protecting our security means protecting the United States from attack. That job, of course, is a lot less onerous now that the Soviet Union has disappeared. But there are still threats to the security of the United States. Proliferation developments, nuclear proliferation or other proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, could damage the United States via intercontinental ballistic missiles or unconventional delivery systems. So, there is a threat to U.S. security, but it is much diminished. There are, of course, a number of people in this country who take a broader look at threats to American security. They see terrorism and drug trafficking, for example, as direct threats to the United States, and they would also include them as national security interests that we would deploy our military to protect us



against. But any way you define it, category number one is to protect the security of the United States, to ensure the physical security of the land and its people.

The second thing that the military protects is our interests. We have interests around the world that we want to protect. I would say that Desert Storm was conducted to protect American interests. It is in America's interest that oil in the Middle East not fall totally under the domination of Saddam Hussein; it's in the interest of the United States that we punish the invasion of one country by another; it's in the interest of the United States that countries that are involved in developing nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction be prevented from doing that.

What is developing now, and what is new on the scene ("new" meaning different from the Cold War, not necessarily new in terms of history), is the interest in using U.S. military forces to protect the values of the United States. In other words, we should not stand aside while people starve, ethnic cleansing should not be allowed to happen, democratic governments should not be thrown out of office and replaced by dictatorships. What is interesting is that we now have a rather consistent and continuous debate in this country on the issue of using U.S. military assets to protect American values. This, I think, is new and different from the Cold War period.

During the Cold War, American military forces were seldom used to protect American values. First, because the world—in particular the world as embodied in the United Nations—did not want the United States to go into a part of the world to further its values. There was a Cold War going on, and if the United States went in to further *its* values, maybe the other side would go in to further *its* values. You would end up with countries getting involved in the conflict of the Cold War. So when there was peacekeeping to be done or ethnic cleansing to be stopped or

starvation to be alleviated, people looked to the militaries of neutral countries, not to the United States and the Soviet Union, not to NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The Swedes, for example, were genuinely neutral and could do the job without engulfing an area in the Cold War.

Second, the U.S. government was not anxious to get involved in protecting values during the Cold War. We needed to save our military—keep our powder dry—for the "Big Show." The Big Show was, of course, World War III against the Soviet Union. It could happen anytime, and we didn't want to have our military forces dispersed around the world and involved in things that were not aimed at the main event. So, basically, during the Cold War this issue didn't arise very much.

Now that the Cold War is over, however, it arises all the time. The world *does* want us involved, and in many cases ours is the only military that is capable of doing what is necessary. It is the only military that has the lift capacity, the communications networks, the intelligence capability, or the reach to do the job. So the world, more and more, would rather like the U.S. military to get involved.

Of course, our excuse or reason not to do it, that is, the need to keep our powder dry for the big showdown against the Soviet Union, has receded considerably. So the debates over protecting values happen, and they're going to happen, and they're going to be with us. We are going to be asked to go in and stop ethnic cleansing in places like Bosnia, to do peacekeeping or peacemaking in places like Somalia, to feed people in Rwanda, to make sure that governments that are democratically elected and booted out get re-

turned in places like Haiti. It's going to happen, it's happening now much more frequently, and it's going to happen a lot more as we look into the future. But of the three uses of military force—protecting American security, protecting American interests, and protecting American values—the new one is

he U.S. government was not anxious to get involved in protecting values during the Cold War. We needed to save our military for the "Big Show" . . . World War III against the Soviet Union.

protecting American values. This role is different and scrambles the calculations a lot.

Let me list six particulars in which using U.S. military assets to protect American values is a different ballgame from using them to protect security or to protect interests.

- Value cases usually mean getting involved in the internal affairs of a country. Not always—but very often—they involve us in internal fights as opposed to dealing with aggression of one country against another. That's different. It's a new world, and it's a very, very much more complicated world. As the U.S. military will tell you, it's much more complicated to deal with fights within a country than with good old-fashioned aggression across borders.
- The second thing about this values agenda that the U.S. military is now being asked to undertake is that it scrambles the hawks and doves. In the good old days when we dealt with security or dealt with interests, you could tell the hawks and you could tell the doves. If a new security issue came up, or if a new issue came up in which we were talking about protecting American interests, the old crowd appeared pretty much the same. The values agenda scrambles things unmercifully. You can't tell a hawk from a dove without a scorecard. Doves on Bosnia are hawks on Somalia; doves on Bosnia are hawks on Haiti. It's a scramble. People who were hawkish generally about the U.S. military forces and use of force in security and interest agendas turn out to be dovish on the values agenda. People who are dovish on the use of military assets to protect our security and our interests turn out to be very hawkish on the values agenda. It's a scrambled world, and if you don't believe it just ask the Catholic Church or the Black Caucus.
- The business of protecting American values opens up a whole lot of cases, a huge agenda—a much bigger agenda than if you're using American forces to protect security or to protect interests. Because there's such a huge agenda, you get into ugly questions like,

“If we are fighting starvation in X, why don't we do it in Y?” And let me tell you there's often no good answer as to why we're doing it in X and we aren't doing it in Y, except to say we haven't got the assets to do it in both and somehow we've decided on X and we've decided against Y.

- The values agenda is driven by the CNN factor. Values are stirred up when people get upset by what they see on CNN: They say, “We have to do something, we must do something about this ethnic cleansing, we must do something about this starvation, we must do something to bring peace here, we've got to do something.” And “something” means using U.S. military forces. But decisions are driven by what is on television in a way that interests and security protection are not.
- People often change their minds about values cases, which makes these cases very hard to deal with. People get stirred up because they see something on CNN that they want to do something about, and so we send the U.S. military in there to do something about it. Then it turns out that it's hard, that Americans lose their lives, that it costs money; and the American public changes its mind. I would contend that is, of course, what happened in Somalia. When we sent forces in, the public thought they were there to feed people. We saw people were starving in Somalia, wanted Americans to do something about it, and applauded sending American troops into Somalia to help feed people. That lasted just as long, it turned out, as no Americans were killed. When Americans were killed, in particular on that one bloody Sunday in the beginning of October when eighteen Americans died, the public changed its mind. The public said, not too irrationally, “We're sending people in there to feed people. If the people they're trying to feed are killing us, why are we doing this? Let's not stay.” And so they changed their minds.

I contend, however, that this skittishness does not hold across the whole spectrum of cases of U.S. military use of force. If the American people believe that the military assets



are being used to protect the security or the interests of the United States—even if Americans get killed—they will hang in there, they will stay with it. I think that is because if something is in the interests of the United States it meets the “parents factor.” You can look the parents in the eye and explain to them why their son or daughter gave his or her life. Americans, I believe, will not be spooked automatically by loss of life. (Some people have drawn the opposite conclusion from Somalia.) I think they will be spooked by the loss of life in pursuing values cases. We haven’t got proof of that yet, so we will see as these examples play out.

- My final point has to do with my job now, which is looking at the intelligence world. This business of dealing with values drives the intelligence community absolutely crazy. They don’t know where a values case is going to crop up. Protecting U.S. security and interests involves a defined set of problems; you have to look out for certain countries and you have to look out for certain activities like drugs and terrorism. But it’s a defined set, and that set doesn’t change very much. If the interest of the country is to protect American values, the values will be constant but the problems can crop up anywhere. Starvation might jump up anywhere; democratic governments are being thrown out. Ethnic cleansing, peacekeeping, peacemaking, all of the things that come under the values rubric, could happen anywhere. What that means is that the intelligence community will suddenly be asked questions about a country into which they have not put their assets or developed the long-term database or long-term trend-line that they can use to advise policymakers. In January, Rwanda was on nobody’s list of priorities; in July, it was right in the top two or three; and then in January again, it was on nobody’s list. It went from below one hundred, to top two or three, to below one hundred again all in one year. It’s the kind of thing that would have made Jim Woolsey’s hair grow gray—if he had any.

That’s the issue we’re dealing with in managing chaos, in coping with these international conflicts into the twenty-first century. It’s the issue of values.

Now, there’s one other point to make here—and it’s an important one—which is that the military, frankly, isn’t anxious to protect values. The military thinks its job is to protect the security and interests of the United States. It is generally uncomfortable with this agenda of protecting the values of the United States. In particular, the U.S. military has three concerns. Let me try to explain them to you.

First, the military believes that values protection is costly—and I believe that it is costly—in terms of readiness. Second, they believe it is costly in terms of manpower. Third, that it can be costly in terms of the signal sent. Let me talk about each of these in turn. Essentially what we are talking about when we are talking about American values—feeding starving people, peacekeeping, peace-enforcing, stopping ethnic cleansing—are really things that are closer to police work than to military work. There is a fundamental point that the American public must understand here. Police work is very, very different from military work. You can take an eighteen-year-old and train him or her to be a very good soldier. You can take an eighteen-year-old and train him or her to be a very good policeman. What is very difficult, and very dangerous, is to take an eighteen-year-old and cross-train him or her to be both a soldier and a policeman. What is even more dangerous is then leaving it up to the eighteen-year-old to decide whether he or she is a policeman or a soldier. These are fundamentally different cultures. If you’re kicking down a door and rushing into a room, do you go in there with guns blazing or do you go in there and read them their rights? That’s the fundamental philosophical difference between police work and military work. They are different cultures.

In the military setting everybody who is wearing a different uniform is a bad guy. In a police setting people are innocent until proven guilty. If you act like a policeman when you should act like a soldier, you’re going to get yourself killed. If you act like a soldier when you should act like a policeman, you’re going to cause a huge international incident because somebody’s going to get killed who shouldn’t get killed. This is a fundamental problem that should not be ignored by the American people when they want their military to go out and do these kinds of jobs. It is a huge dilemma. It

leads into the second dilemma for the military, which is costliness in terms of manpower.

To deal with this police-soldier dichotomy, the U.S. military must take a unit that is about to go out on a police detail and train it as a police unit, then send it out to do its police work, and then retrain it back to soldiery when it comes off the police duty. That means there is a three-to-one manpower ratio involved in continuously doing a peacekeeping job. If you want to send a unit out on a peacekeeping detail for, let's say, six months (and that's about the extent to which the military wants to assign any particular set of people to peacekeeping work), six months before they go they get trained to do peacekeeping. Then they go do peacekeeping for six months, and then they come back and for six months they're trained to be soldiers again.

If you have a battalion doing peacekeeping in the Sinai, you have one battalion out there doing the peacekeeping, you have one preparing to go out, and you have another that has just come back and is now preparing to become soldiers again. So, to put a battalion on the Sinai you need three battalions, which is a brigade. Putting a brigade on the Golan Heights would require three brigades, which is a division. We've only got ten army divisions in the bottom-up review, so that's one-tenth of the U.S. Army involved in protecting the Golan Heights. It would be even worse if you had a peace in Bosnia in which the United States was committed to sending 20,000 to 25,000 troops, or a full division. That's a three-division commitment to keep one division in Bosnia. Three divisions out of ten in the entire U.S. Army is getting to be a serious number and would be very expensive in terms of manpower.

The third problem with values protection is that it is expensive in terms of the signal sent. The military is very conscious of the CNN factor, and very conscious of the likelihood that the public will change its mind if things go badly and will want to pull American troops out. They see that it is dangerous in international relations to have a super-power send its troops in and then change its mind

and pull them out, because this emboldens bad guys. People get brave because they think that the United States is a paper tiger and that they can get away with things, so they will take risks. They will do things that they shouldn't do, and the people who pay if the United States is misjudged are, of course, the people in uniform. They know that this is very dangerous—they know that this is playing with fire—this business of getting upset at what is on television and rushing troops into a situation and then getting upset when people get killed and pulling them out. What signal does that send to Saddam Hussein, what signal does that send to

What is very difficult, and very dangerous, is to take an eighteen-year-old and cross-train him or her to be both a soldier and a policeman. What is even more dangerous is then leaving it up to the eighteen-year-old to decide whether he or she is a policeman or a soldier.

North Korea, to Iran, and to other countries where we would hope the signal would be different?

Basically, the problem from the military's standpoint is threefold: the problem in terms of readiness, the problem in terms of manpower, and the problem in terms of the signal sent. There is a battle going on in this country between two schools of thought: those who argue that we should send people into value agenda situations and those who argue that we should not. Essentially, the two sides are the realists and isolationists versus the internationalists and moralists. The realists and isolationists would argue that we really ought to use our military for national security interests only. They contend that we have problems here at home and that all of these value agenda conflicts are potential quagmires. There are dangers in the wrong signals sent—there are dangers across the board. They cost money, they get us no friends, they make a lot of enemies. This side's claim is that we ought to stay away from value agenda crises.

The internationalists and moralists make a different argument. They insist that we cannot ignore these value cases, that ignoring the value cases is the kind of thing that brought us the Holocaust. America stands for certain values and we cannot just walk away from value agenda conflicts. We would be a poorer country, a weaker country, a less admirable country if we walked away from value cases. Using the U.S. military only for interests and security means that it is not going to be very useful because most of the problems arising today are value agenda cases. If you use the U.S. military only for security and interests, the whole U.S. military will turn out to be like nuclear weapons were during the Cold War. They were important, but they were expensive and weren't really very useful for solving current problems.

The moralists and internationalists also say that if the U.S. military is only going to be used for security and interest issues, we shouldn't be spending 200-250-275 billion dollars a year for something that can't solve current problems that the American public sees on the television and wants to do something about. Finally, the internationalists and moralists argue that the United States must threaten the use of force to have any diplomatic leverage to resolve these value cases. If the United States is going to threaten force, then it had better be ready to use force.

This debate of realists and isolationists versus internationalists and moralists is going to go on every time one of these things comes up. We saw it in Haiti. We saw it in Somalia. We see it daily in Bosnia. We saw it in Rwanda, and we're going to see it again and again.

I think, first of all, that we have to recognize that neither extreme position is going to win this argument. The United States is not going to get involved in no value agenda cases and we're certainly not going to get involved in all value agenda cases. The extreme positions are not going to win. There is no chance that you can get involved in all of them, because even if we had a United States military the size of the one we had in World War II,

we would not have enough resources to deal with the value agenda cases that exist in the world today. So there is no chance that we are going to do all of them. The American public is not going to allow its money to be spent on that kind of an agenda.

On the other hand, I do not think the United States can afford not to do any of them either. I can't believe the president of the United States is going to totally turn his back on all the value agenda issues that come up. I am persuaded by the point that you would need at least to threaten the use of force if diplomacy is to have any kind of a chance of solving these kinds of problems, and that if we threaten the use of force, we should have the capability and the willingness to use it.

So I think that we are going to be involved somehow in these value cases with military assets. The argument, then, isn't about the extreme positions, it's about a more limited range of possibilities. Do we do relatively more of them or relatively fewer of them? That is the debate that is going to take place in the American body politic.

Given that reality, the United States needs three things, and I hope that this conference will make some moves toward developing knowledge on these three things. The first thing the United States needs is to develop some kind of overall philosophy about the use of U.S. military forces in the post-Cold War world. We need some kind of philosophy about when we're going to go into these value cases and when we're not. The public now believes the U.S. government has no philosophy in the conduct of its foreign policy. The public believes the government is driven solely by CNN and that if the clamor gets high enough, they will send the troops in. That is how the public looks at it, and the public has no confidence when it sees policy being made that way. What we need is some kind of a framework for doing this, but I do not think you can be precise about that framework. You cannot, I think, lay out—like Cap Weinberger did and Gary Hart did several years ago—a checklist that will tell you whether to use force in these value cases. You cannot do that because, just as soon as you write up that checklist, something will

If the United States is going to threaten force, then it had better be ready to use force.

come up that doesn't fit the checklist and you'll want to send forces in anyway. Or something will fit the checklist and you won't want to go in despite that. But we need some kind of more general framework to use in deciding which cases are important enough to do and which ones we just won't do. And we need to apply that framework before we get into the particulars.

Second, we need to develop better ways for the military to intervene in values cases. Simply accepting the three-to-one ratio we discussed earlier is unacceptable. I think we have to ask if there is a better way to do this. We now have a required three-to-one ratio of troops in training to troops on the ground in every values agenda case, and we understand why you have a three-to-one ratio, and we understand why you have to teach people to be policemen and retrain them to be soldiers. But somehow we need to figure out a better way to do that. Do we need to develop a foreign legion concept where a certain unit does this kind of thing? Or maybe some units in the U.S. military should do police work while others do soldiering. The problem is that this course has been considered and rejected by a number of militaries in the world—the British among them. The British worried for a long time about doing police work in Northern Ireland. They rejected dividing their forces on the grounds that by dividing the army between soldiers and policemen, you create an army of first-class citizens and second-class citizens. The soldiers will be the first-class citizens and the policemen will be second-class citizens. So maybe this particular idea is impractical, but we do need some new ideas.

We might figure out a way to use the reserves in peacekeeping missions. Secretary of Defense Bill Perry and Army Chief of Staff General Gordon Sullivan have been working on this question, and I worked on it when I was in Congress and in the defense secretary's office.

Or maybe we should divide up the work among countries according to their expertise. Maybe U.S. forces could do the intelligence, logistics, and communications, and we could get other countries to provide some of the manpower on these peacekeeping missions. There are a number of ideas

brewing, and we ought to work on them, figure them out, and do them.

Third, we need to examine consistently and systematically past examples of the use of U.S. military force for this values agenda and learn from our mistakes. I have been doing a little work on it, and I've found that when we have used U.S. military forces for the values agenda we have been successful about two-thirds of the time. We are successful most of the time—success being defined as going in, doing the job, and being able to leave. We cannot call it a success if we go in and do the job and end up with troops there on a more or less permanent basis. But if we go in, do the job, and pull the troops out, that's a success. We need to have a systematic look at all the examples in the past and ask, "If they failed, why did they fail?" We need to isolate the variables that are important to examine before we send in American troops.

A preliminary analysis tells us that there are three reasons why things most often go wrong when we send American troops and American assets in to deal with the values agenda. Number one is a failure to understand the mission or the changing of the mission once the troops get in there. Somalia and Beirut are cases where the mission was changed, or we had mission creep, or something was different from when we started.

The second reason that things have gone wrong in values agenda cases is that we have underestimated the enemy, the problem, the opposition, or the difficulty. It's very hard to get the right estimation of these things, but I think we clearly underestimated the Vietnamese and we underestimated the Somalis. On the other hand, we probably overestimated the Iraqis and the Panama defense forces of Noriega. So it's hard to get it right.

The third thing that goes wrong is that we fail to think through at the outset what the exit strategy is, how we get out of it. How do you get home once you have gone in? Now we pull out either because we accomplished the mission and we hand it off to somebody else, or we just set a timetable and we leave. But we ought to have thought that through ahead of time. When we have not, we've been stuck there for a long time, as we are in Korea and in northern Iraq, trying to feed the Kurds.

This last question is the subject of another speech I might give when I have a chance to come and talk with you, maybe at one of the working groups that the Institute of Peace has when it deals with this topic again. It's an important topic. The Institute is on to something here. There are many aspects to it, but one of the most important—and one I hope you will give some thought to in your working groups—is the use of U.S. military assets in solving this problem of managing chaos, of coping with conflict into the next century.



Q. You touched briefly on the question of intelligence. When you have an intelligence organization or organizations looking at the whole community oriented toward one particular mission or a primary mission, how can we make the change? I think some people believe that one can just change over and go to other things, but I think it's rather more complicated than that. How are we to recast our intelligence following the Cold War?

A. I'll know better when we've had some chance to study it, but let me just briefly say that I think the intelligence world of the future is going to be more complex, and clearly will have a bigger agenda than the one we had during the Cold War. The things that you want the intelligence community to be concerned about in the post-Cold War world are the following kinds of categories:

First of all, countries that we want to keep our eyes on, which would include North Korea, Iraq, Iran, and others like that. These countries are (a) dangerous, (b) hostile, and (c) secret. I mean they are excessively secretive. And that combination is a difficult one, and an example of why you need intelligence. That trio, of course, describes the Soviet Union, which is not to say that any of these countries are on the scale of the Soviet Union in terms of a threat. Nevertheless they are a threat, so you need an intelligence capability to deal with them.

Second, there are some activities that the United States needs intelligence to keep track of: terrorism, drugs, and especially the proliferation of nuclear weapons and all weapons of mass destruc-

tion. The last one is an activity that threatens the United States, an activity that we need to know something about.

Third, there is a changing group of countries that we want to know something about. Haiti, Somalia—these are countries that come up on the screen and then drop off, which is difficult for the intelligence community to deal with.

And there is more: there is a brand new intelligence agenda, an agenda of some real opportunities—not threats, but opportunities for intelligence—that are important. These opportunities are in such areas as the economic, environmental, and health fields. The intelligence community is gradually being drawn into these areas by various agencies of the U.S. government. So it's a different world, it's a bigger agenda, and it's more complicated.

Q. While I accept the three categories you mentioned for use of military forces, I suggest that a part of the action that you place under the values category really belongs under national interests. I think selective actions expanding areas of no conflict like North America or Western Europe or other areas that have become areas of no conflict is a rather important contribution to national security. We do have favorable conditions to go into that now, because no war is brewing among the major powers and we have quite a few new devices as a heritage of the Cold War at work on that kind of thing. Would you comment on that?

A. Yes, I think that's a point. Let me also say—and I should have said this during the speech—that situations rarely arise that fall neatly into just values or just interests. The case of Haiti clearly has values involved—particularly regarding the government, the elected government, which was thrown out. That's something Americans hold very dear: that rulers should be chosen by votes, rather than by force. But there were also some clear national interests—in particular the potential for a flood of refugees coming into the United States from Haiti—so it was a mixed case. Bosnia, I think, was also a mixed case. Bosnia is primarily a values case of ethnic cleansing, but there are some national security interests there. It would be contrary to our national security interests if the thing got out of hand and Greece ended up fighting with

Turkey, for example. Or if the fighting produced a flood of refugees or a backlash so that Muslim countries around the world wouldn't cooperate with the West on a whole range of issues because they thought the West was ignoring the plight of Muslims in Bosnia. So there are probably national security interests speckled throughout here. It's not always easy to categorize a case.

Q. We're beginning to hear the notion that because of Bosnia, NATO is in a serious crisis and in its most difficult moment since Suez. Do you think there's a certain amount of press hype in this, and would you comment on the future of NATO?

A. I think that is a serious problem, and I don't think there's press hype in it. I think that it is a serious, serious problem that the disagreement on former Yugoslavia could seriously damage NATO. And, of course, the problem is that there are a number of other questions facing NATO on which there is very little agreement—such as NATO's expanded membership (if so how, and if so who), and all these kinds of questions. And then there is the fundamental question of, "What is NATO in the post-Cold War, post-Soviet, post-Warsaw Pact world?" That, I think, needs to be worked out. I don't pooh-pooh the claims that this is the biggest crisis since Suez 1956.

Q. Thank you for very enlightening remarks in clarifying what I might call the view from the U.S. military. The American Bar Association and others have recommended the creation of some form of international police force. In the case of the American Bar Association, they have been talking in terms of a standby force under Article 43 and so forth. Others have talked in terms of a foreign legion, which you mentioned. But I would solicit your comments and observations on this subject.

A. Yes, I think there are a number of options, and I perhaps should have mentioned them in the speech when I mentioned the need to find new ways of managing value cases. The way we're doing it now means we're not going to do very many interventions of this type. Besides just reforming the U.S. military's approach to these things, there is the possibility of reforming international organizations' approach to them and the

various proposals connected with the United Nations. There is also the possibility of using the UN in a more creative or more useful way to deal with values issues. I think we ought to look at these possibilities, if only because I think that the way we are doing it now needs improvement. The standard procedure is to have the U.S. military go in there and establish the kind of setting we want and establish who's the boss, and then hand it off to the UN. But if we're going to hand off more things to the UN, the UN has to figure out how to do these things a little more efficiently and a little better for the military. Could the UN go and do it from the outset? Could you have within the UN some kind of an organization that would, in effect, do this police work from the outset? Maybe, but the question is, who's going to pay for it? Militaries are not cheap: you get what you pay for. The more you pay, the better it is. The UN has a tough time meeting its debts now. The question is, how would it pay for a standing military of some considerable size and capability? There are a lot of difficult questions to answer.

Furthermore, the U.S. military has three capabilities that no other military in the world has. The United States would have to do them for the UN or the UN would have to spend a large amount of money on its military to do them. One is logistics—the ability to pick up big units, division-sized units, and fly them several thousand miles and put them down there. The U.S. military has it; the Soviet military used to have it, but they probably couldn't get the planes off the ground now. And the question would be, who's going to get the military of the UN to wherever it wants to go?

The second capability is communications. The U.S. military spends huge amounts of money on communications. The ability to communicate back and forth and from air to ground is part of the reason the U.S. military is so good. Again, whenever the UN goes into a place, or even when some collection of countries goes into a place, they usually rely on the United States for communications and logistics.


The third capability is intelligence. What's going on over the hill? Again, one of the reasons the U.S. military is so expensive is because it has to spend a lot of money on intelligence assets—capabilities



and assets, drones, satellites, things that help the commanders, things that help give fair warning.

Another question is readiness—making sure that the force is capable and ready. When you put together a UN force, or a conglomerate force, you must address questions like who's in charge? What language do you speak? To what extent are the operations interoperable? We spent forty years working on those problems in NATO. In Desert

Storm you saw a fairly efficient force of European allies fighting together—the British, the French, and the Americans. But there had been a lot of interoperability exercises over those years. (Of course, the French were only partially involved in those exercises.) Interoperability is something that takes years to develop, as we discovered in NATO, and it's not going to be put together quickly in a UN force.



TED KOPPEL



The Global Information Revolution and TV News

I belong, I suppose, to the mainstream media, in the sense, at least, that words still bear an approximate relationship to their original definition. They don't, of course. Suffice it to say that the field of media in general has expanded to such a degree that most of us over the age of fifty are barely able to keep track. Not only have the tools of communication multiplied, so too has their accessibility. It has become, in our lifetimes, both easier to receive information and to disseminate it.

This has created the opportunities and the problems that all of us who are, directly or peripherally, involved in the conduct of foreign affairs must confront.

But let's return for a moment to the issue of definitions. The meaning of words evolves. Whereas once "media" referred essentially to newspapers and magazines, and then gradually expanded to include radio, film, and television, the term also had an implied reference. To speak of "the media" suggests, to this day, forms of communication controlled by an elite few. Hearst and Pulitzer gave way to Sarnoff and Paley, who in turn were obliged to acknowledge the existence of Goldenson and then Turner. Apple and Microsoft, Sony and Panasonic, the King Brothers and Rupert Murdoch are today as much a part of the media galaxy as the Sulzbergers and the Grahams. To the degree that these people and corporations control the superhighways—the main arteries of the communications network—the blue highways, the back roads, are now in so many hands that it has changed the nature of communications altogether. That, after all, is what concerns—or what should concern—many of you.

But before we examine those changes a little more closely, one more observation on the governing principle of communication between and among us all. In *this* country at least, all of these twentieth- and twenty-first-century media are controlled by an eighteenth-century concept: the First Amendment to the Constitution. Anyone in the United States who wishes to be a journalist need simply announce himself as such. There is no requirement for a license; there is no need for a preliminary course of study. No individual or body of individuals exercises even the limited control that the commissioner of baseball, for example, once had over what used to be known as our na-



tional pastime. The all but universal freedom that was designed to encourage political oratory and pamphleteering now encompasses a somewhat expanded universe. But even more significant is the accessibility of the media themselves. There has been—how best to put it?—a democratization of media. They are no longer the exclusive tools of enlightenment or playthings of the powerful few. To the degree that any man, woman, or (increasingly) child in America has access to a computer, tape recorder, or video camera, he or she can transmit information across great distances to large numbers of people.

Although the United States has always been in the vanguard of the communications industry, there seems to have been less appreciation for the international implications of this new reality here than in many other parts of the world. The samizdat of the 1980s, both in the former Soviet Union and throughout Eastern Europe, was no longer the typed or handwritten document, but rather the videotape. Just as the Ayatollah Khomeini's audiotapes were recorded during the mid and late 1970s in France and then smuggled into the Shah's Iran, so too were video journals compiled from western news reports and tapes shot with 8mm home video cameras throughout Eastern Europe, mass produced and then passed from hand to hand throughout Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia . . . East Germany and Romania. During the mid-1980s, we found one church in Gdansk with tiers of videotape recorders—more than sixty of them—capable of mass-producing many hundreds of tapes every day. Each of these tapes, in turn, would be distributed, recopied, and passed from family to family. A crude form of mass communication, but effective, nevertheless.

The tiny satellite dishes that are only now being marketed here in the United States have been ubiquitous throughout Eastern Europe for nearly a decade. It was neither accident nor coincidence that the revolution in Romania was ignited in Timisoara, the city that is closest to the former Yugoslavia. Even without satellite dishes, the residents of Timisoara were able to pick up CNN broadcasts from their western neighbor. When I visited Timisoara shortly after the Ceausescus were killed, I was repeatedly told how dissidents had taken encouragement from scenes of antigov-

ernment activities in Hungary, Poland, and East Germany that they had watched on CNN.

Nor was this cross-pollination of political activism limited to Eastern Europe. What happened in Europe was seen and fueled the activism of dissidents in China and in the occupied territories of Israel and throughout South Africa. And the same thing, I might add, happened in the other direction. Satellite technology has done for television what shortwave transmissions did for radio. It has made geographic borders irrelevant; but even more to the point, technologies that were once so complex and expensive that they were available only to the few have been placed in the hands of the many.

I ask you to keep all this in mind as sort of a subtext to the larger issue that I know concerns most of you: the interrelationship between the conduct of foreign policy and the media. The fact that media—capable of conveying great quantities of information to large numbers of people in distant locations—the fact that such media are now in the hands of the general public redefines, if you think about it, the nature of mass media.

But permit me to focus for a few minutes on the more conventional, the more traditional definition. Think of mass media as we have been accustomed to thinking about them: powerful organs of communications under the control of a few powerful men and women. Even under that limited definition, times have changed; or perhaps it would be more accurate to say . . . *time* has changed.

In January 1992, my "Nightline" colleagues and I were the first American journalists to be granted visas to Iraq. We arrived in Baghdad from Amman late in the evening. We drove from the airport straight to the foreign ministry, where I met with Nizar Hamdoun. Even though it was after 11 P.M. by the time we got there, the offices lining the corridor down to Hamdoun's were all occupied. This, remember, was only a few days before the beginning of Operation Desert Storm. All the offices had television sets. Each television was tuned to CNN. I suspect that if a colleague had walked down the appropriate corridors at the State Department, the CIA, or the Pentagon at the same moment, they too would have found televisions in corresponding of-

fices tuned to CNN. To the degree that either the U.S. or Iraqi government sought insights into what was happening in the other's capital, it frequently obtained its first information from CNN. The information is dispatched and received literally at the speed of light; but the effect of that information is, in almost all of its aspects, disproportionate. Far more information was flowing from Washington to Baghdad than the other way around. The actual audience in Iraq, of course, is tiny. Indeed in most foreign countries where CNN is seen, it is available only in hotels, where it's accessible to foreign visitors but to very few locals, and in the government ministries of that country. A few thousand others may also have access to the network through satellite dishes, but there is no equivalency in the exchange of information. It is, in other words, far easier for Saddam Hussein, for example, to reach a wide audience in the United States with his own spin on events than for the U.S. government to do the same in Iraq.

And that, in a sense, is the central point. The conduct of U.S. foreign policy is influenced far less by its failure to reach large audiences in other countries than by the constant requirement to shape perceptions here at home. And that imperative is continually influenced by the barrage of information that inundates the American viewer and listener every day. Until now we have been largely spared the worst consequences of this phenomenon because of the ignorance and incompetence of our foreign adversaries. They are not yet as adept at the manipulation of U.S. public opinion as they believe themselves to be. You have only to recall the scene of Saddam Hussein benevolently patting a clearly petrified young British hostage on the head. The intent of that scene and its impact could not have been more dissonant.

But simple pictures can, and do, have enormous consequences for American foreign policy. Scenes

of starving children in Somalia clearly helped precipitate our involvement in that country, just as scenes of that dead Ranger being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu speeded up the timetable for our withdrawal. Scenes of incredible brutality in Rwanda and Haiti forced a degree of involvement in both countries that had little or nothing to do with what is normally defined as U.S. national interest. The same can be said of television pictures from Tiananmen Square in 1989, of scenes showing young Palestinians being beaten by Israeli troops during the height of the Intifada, and, more recently, of the incredible violence being perpetrated throughout the former Yugoslavia. The operative question is not whether such scenes have consequences—they do—but whether those consequences are intended; if so, by whom, and if not, whether those consequences can be avoided.

Many years ago, a professor of communications by the name of Wilbur Schramm put forward what he described as "the gatekeeper" theory. It was predicated on the way information was processed back in the 1950s, a time when opinion leaders both within and outside the media tended to set the national agenda. It was, if you will, sort of a trickle-down theory of information, under which a few men and women determined which issues were of importance to the nation. During recent years, that theory has been largely turned on its head. This is, in some measure, a function of focus groups and opinion polls, which have encouraged our political leaders to seek direction from the public, rather than the other way around. But it is also a function of the growing accessibility of the media themselves.

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Increasingly, information is being gathered and disseminated by more people and in a more chaotic fashion than ever before; and, whether coincidentally or not, it is happening at a time when

the conduct of U.S. foreign policy itself is being subjected to its own chaos theory. If nothing else, anticommunism provided the United States with a sense of direction and stability that, for understandable reasons, is no longer present. While there is no discernible reason for growing nostalgic over the absence of the Cold War, there is every reason to be alarmed about the inability of our leaders to focus clearly on where our national interests now lie. It is insufficient and ambiguous to simply preach a gospel of human rights, democracy, and free trade. For one thing, they are not always compatible, as has recently been illustrated again in our relationship with the People's Republic of China. For another, the gospel is too broad. How is it applied, for example, to Bosnia?

The absence of adequate focus produces the political equivalent of a vacuum, into which all opinions, however inconsistent they may be, are irresistibly drawn. Random scenes of cruelty and suffering, instantaneously communicated to the nation from around the world, are destined to have a disproportionate influence on public opinion because no countervailing compass point exists. Indeed, public policy is doomed to be shaped by public opinion, rather than the other way around, because there is no prevailing public policy. Or if it exists, it is not widely understood. We process information in this country the way we eat: on the run, without adequate time for digestion. McThought! Fast food and fast thought fill a need for instant gratification, but neither is quite as nourishing as when the product is prepared with care and consumed in a more leisurely fashion. And yet, all the elements are conspiring against taking time and care in both industries. The one is as damaging to the body politic as the other can be to the body.

Without delving into too much detail, those of us who are in the business of communicating information are being pressured by a combination of time, money, and technology. Journalism has always been driven by competition; by deadlines. But, to give just one example, when I began broadcasting for ABC News more than thirty years ago,

we had just one deadline a day. The evening news broadcast at 6:30 was it.

A truly major event might warrant a bulletin—that is, the interruption of regular programming—but bulletins were few and far between in those days. What that afforded those of us who had reports to prepare was time. These days, we have an overnight news program, news segments that appear on “Good Morning America,” several news magazines, “World News Tonight,” and “Nightline.” For a single reporter covering a breaking news story, especially one overseas, there is simply less time available to gather material for each of the two or three or more stories a day that he or she may now be required to deliver.

Next category—money! It's probably fair to say that each of the network news divisions now spends several hundred times a year more than it did when I first joined ABC News. But, whereas thirty years ago news was considered a loss leader—the network meeting its public obligation, but at a financial

loss—these days, news divisions make . . . and are expected to make money. That has meant, among other things, a cut-back in the

number and size of foreign bureaus operated by the three major networks. Foreign correspondents, as a category, are simply shrinking.

This is not to say that major events overseas aren't covered, or that enormous resources aren't marshalled and dispatched. But for that to happen the event must not only be important, it must be the kind of event that engages the interest of a huge American audience. Coverage, in other words, tends to be intense, but relatively short-lived (as in the recent cases of Haiti, Rwanda, Somalia and, to a lesser degree, Bosnia). And to the degree that administrations here in Washington are reactive to public pressure, the intense focus on particular crises is developing an unfortunate tendency to reflect that sporadic coverage.

We process information in this country the way we eat: on the run, without adequate time for digestion. McThought!



I mentioned three factors that are exerting pressure on the communications industry: time, money, and technology. In some respects, it is the technology, our capacity to report “live” on events as they are happening, that is having the most serious impact on journalism and on the conduct of foreign policy. In both cases, the time for reflection and careful thought has been reduced. When we report on events, even as they’re occurring, we have little or no time to apply the most important tools of journalism: editing, analysis, and context. Simply focusing a camera on an event is no substitute for journalism. But our ability to do that, to broadcast something that is happening, in real time . . . places enormous pressure on us . . . and, more important, on those of you who actually conduct foreign policy. Call it “the satellite imperative.” When the American public becomes accustomed to seeing an event or hearing from a foreign leader in real time, the expectation arises for an immediate response. To refrain from doing so requires a greater discipline than recent administrations have shown. To say nothing suggests an inability to respond; but to respond immediately frequently exposes a half-baked policy that must later be amended. Rather than conveying decisiveness, the impression is one of incompetence.


The “chaos theory,” as some of you have applied it to world events, should also be applied to the world of mass communication. The greater accessibility to its tools has placed the flow of information in the hands of all too many inexperienced and untrained practitioners. The ravenous public

appetite for new and more dramatic stories every day has resulted in an explosion of programs, spiralling downward in the never-ending search for an even larger lowest common denominator. The ability to communicate instantaneously, from anywhere, to anywhere, has injected a damaging element into the natural tendency toward competitiveness.

Certainly we have an obligation to avoid sensationalism and to maintain the traditional standards of good journalism. But if we are to avoid sliding into information anarchy, the executive branch of government, in particular, will have to exercise genuine leadership. That means a clear definition of national interest whenever a foreign crisis erupts, coupled with a steady determination to keep the focus on that national interest.

We in the media tend, for the most part, to be willows in the wind; shifting direction with each passing breeze; focusing, not on the national interest, but rather on what appears to interest the nation at any given moment. You cannot and should not expect the media to take the lead in determining how or whether the national interest is served by the continued existence of NATO or by unilateral U.S. intervention in Bosnia.

That is the proper function of the executive branch of government. When it fails to exercise that responsibility with firmness and with clarity, the inevitable consequence is chaos. It has always been so, but now, more than ever.



Contributors

Les Aspin is currently chairman of President Clinton's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. From January 1993 to January 1994, he was secretary of defense, a post from which he initiated a fundamental reexamination of U.S. military requirements in light of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. From 1970 to 1993, Aspin was a member of the House of Representatives from the first congressional district of Wisconsin; he served on the Armed Services Committee and became chairman of that committee in 1985. From 1968 to 1970, he taught economics at Marquette University, and he worked under Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara at the Pentagon from 1966 to 1968. Before that he served as staff assistant to the chairman of President Kennedy's Council of Economic Advisors. Aspin holds a B.A. from Yale University, an M.A. from Oxford University, and a Ph.D. in economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is currently also distinguished professor of international policy at Marquette University and holds the Arleigh A. Burke chair in strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.

Ted Koppel has been anchor and managing editor of the news program "Nightline" since 1980. Before his "Nightline" assignment, he worked as an anchor, foreign and domestic correspondent, and bureau chief for ABC News. From 1971 to 1980, he was ABC News' chief diplomatic correspondent, and for two years beginning in 1975, he anchored the "ABC Saturday Night News." Koppel has won several major broadcasting awards, including twenty-three Emmy Awards, five George Foster Peabody Awards, eight duPont-Columbia Awards, nine Overseas Press Club Awards, two George Polk Awards, and two Sigma Delta Chi Awards, the highest honor bestowed for public service by the Society of Professional Journalists. In 1994, he received the first Goldsmith Career Award for Excellence in Journalism from the Joan Shorenstein Barone Center of the Press, Politics, and Public Policy at Harvard University. In addition, he was the recipient of the Gabriel Personal Achievement Award from the National Catholic Association of Broadcasters and Communicators. Koppel is coauthor of the book *In the National Interest*. He holds a B.A. degree from Syracuse University and an M.A. from Stanford University.



The Changing Character of International Conflict

NOVEMBER 30, MORNING

Welcoming Address

Chester A. Crocker, Chairman, Board of Directors, United States Institute of Peace

Session 1 **The Character of Twenty-First Century Conflict**

A conceptual assessment of the changing character of international conflict designed to advance today's awareness of change and the breakdown of institutions created in the Cold War era.

Moderator

Paul D. Wolfowitz, SAIS, The Johns Hopkins University

Speakers

Samuel P. Huntington, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University

Robert D. Kaplan, author of "The Coming Anarchy" and *Balkan Ghosts*

Session 2 **A New Look at Key Sources of Conflict**

A focus on known and anticipated sources of conflict in the coming decades, including the resurgence of ethno-religious nationalism; environmental and related threats; and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the persistent threat posed by certain closed societies.

Moderator

Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, American Enterprise Institute

Speakers

G. M. Tamás, Institute of Philosophy, Hungarian Academy of Sciences

Jessica Mathews, Council on Foreign Relations

Lee Hongkoo, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Unification, Republic of Korea

NOVEMBER 30, LUNCHEON**Challenges to the U.S. Military
in Post-Cold War Peace-
keeping and Humanitarian
Interventions****Speaker**

Les Aspin, Former Secretary of Defense and Congressman

NOVEMBER 30, AFTERNOON**New Institutions of
Conflict Resolution****Session 3****NGOs: The New
Conflict Managers?**

An examination of the changing roles of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) across the broad spectrum of conflict-related activity. The evolving relationships among NGOs, governments, and international organizations in managing international conflict will also be addressed.

Moderator

Allen Weinstein, Board of Directors, United States Institute of Peace, and The Center for Democracy

Speakers

Phyllis E. Oakley, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration

Jan Eliasson, Permanent Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Kingdom of Sweden

Julia Taft, *InterAction*

Vesna Pesic, Visiting Fellow, United States Institute of Peace, and Center for Anti-War Action, Belgrade

Session 4**NGO Burdens and Needs as
Conflict Managers**

This session will ask leaders from various parts of the NGO community to assess the increasing burdens upon—and opportunities for—NGOs in managing international conflict directly. The speakers will discuss the extent to which—and how and why—NGOs with other mandates and expectations have been called upon to be direct conflict managers. Finally, speakers will survey their evolving needs as international actors, both under their traditional mandates and new ones.

Moderator

W. Scott Thompson, Board of Directors, United States Institute of Peace, and Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University

Speakers

John Paul Lederach, Eastern Mennonite College

Lionel Rosenblatt, Refugees International

Andrew Natsios, World Vision

Vivian Lowery Derryck, African-American Institute

DECEMBER 1, MORNING

Session 5 Key Challenges in International Conflict Management

Panel A Averting Chaos: Preventive Diplomacy in Eurasia and Africa

Moderator

Speakers

Panel B NGO Conflict Resolution, Relief, and Rebuilding Activity in Former Yugoslavia

Moderator

Speakers

Part 1: Case Study Sessions (three simultaneous panels)

Drawing from preventive diplomacy efforts in East Europe, Asia, and Africa, this panel will explore the roles that the UN, the U.S. government, regional organizations such as the OSCE and OAU, and nongovernmental organizations are playing and can play in early warning and preventive action in potential crisis spots.

Michael Lund, Senior Scholar, United States Institute of Peace

John Marks, Search for Common Ground

John J. Maresca, former U.S. Ambassador to OSCE

Linda Perkin, Deputy Director for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, United Nations

Harold Fleming, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs

This breakout will examine NGO conflict resolution, relief, and rebuilding activity in former Yugoslavia, with a focus on Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia. Special attention will be given to the question of NGO, government, and international organization support for the Muslim-Croat agreement in Bosnia. Indigenous NGO activity will be discussed along with the activities of those from abroad.

Patricia Carley, Program Officer, United States Institute of Peace

Hugh Hamilton, Deputy Coordinator, East European Assistance, U.S. Department of State

Max Primorac, Croatian Democracy Project

Nadia Diuk, National Endowment for Democracy

Robert DeVecchi, International Rescue Committee

Vesna Pesic, Visiting Fellow, United States Institute of Peace, and Center for Anti-War Action, Belgrade

Panel C**Bringing Peace to Sudan:
The Roles of NGOs, Governments,
and Regional Organizations**

This panel will examine the full range of activity—including the roles of NGOs, governments, and regional organizations—that has been involved in efforts to bring peace to Sudan. The panel will also assess the prospects for coordinated activity in the future, including the relationships between internal actors and international actors. Among activities to be surveyed will be advocacy, mediation, Track II diplomacy, relief work, conflict resolution training, and support for mediation.

Moderator

David Smock, Director of the Grant Program, United States Institute of Peace

Speakers

Francis Deng, Brookings Institution

John Prendergast, Center of Concern

Session 5**The Future of Intervention
in Violent Internal Conflicts****Part 2: Plenary Session**

This session focuses on the recent experience of NGOs, governments, and international organizations in intervening in violent internal conflicts. Focusing on what has actually been done in humanitarian, political, and military efforts, the speakers will address the future prospects of such interventions.

Moderator

Denis McLean, Distinguished Fellow, United States Institute of Peace

Speakers

James Schear, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

J. Brian Atwood, Administrator, U.S. Agency for International Development (remarks presented by Nan Borton, Director, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, USAID)

Joseph Kennedy, Africare

John J. Maresca, former U.S. Ambassador to OSCE

DECEMBER 1, LUNCHEON**An Interactive Forum on the
Global Information
Revolution****Speaker**

Ted Koppel, Anchor and Managing Editor, ABC News

December 1, Afternoon

The New Diplomacy and New Tools for Conflict Management

Session 6 *"The New Diplomacy"*

Presupposing the need for innovation and creativity in diplomacy, this session will examine the potential efficacy of new techniques and means while evaluating the continuing applicability of more traditional tools. The speakers will assess whether an international consensus is building, or can be built, regarding the future of national and multinational intervention in regional conflicts. They will also examine the possible utilization of the experience and techniques of the NGO and business communities by governments and international organizations.

Moderator

Chester Crocker, Chairman, Board of Directors, United States Institute of Peace, and School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University

Speakers

Chester Crocker

Robert Zoellick, Executive Vice President, Fannie Mae

Mohamed Sahnoun, International Development Research Centre, Ottawa

Thomas R. Getman, World Vision

Session 7 *Conflict Management Tools*

(three simultaneous panels)

Panel A **International Conflict Resolution** **Skills Training (ICREST)**

This panel will focus on the contribution negotiation training and conflict resolution skills training can make to better prepare international affairs professionals (from the diplomatic, military, or NGO sectors) to undertake complicated new assignments.

Moderator

Lawrence P. Taylor, Director, National Foreign Training Center, U.S. Department of State

Speakers

Hrach Gregorian, Director of Education and Training, United States Institute of Peace

Steve Pieczenik, Consultant, United States Institute of Peace

Panel B
Cross-Cultural Negotiation

John Paul Lederach, Eastern Mennonite College

Lewis Rasmussen, Program Officer, United States Institute of Peace

This panel explores the impact that culture has upon international negotiation and how awareness and skills training in national negotiating styles can make negotiators more effective.

Moderator

Richard H. Solomon, President, United States Institute of Peace

Speakers

John Graham, University of California, Irvine

Jean Freymond, Centre for Applied Studies in International Negotiations, Geneva

Chas. W. Freeman, Jr., Distinguished Fellow, United States Institute of Peace

Jerrold Schecter, Peace Fellow, United States Institute of Peace

Panel C
Information and Data Management

This panel will explore the current and potential use of various software programs, information- and data-management systems, and the information highway during negotiations as aids to general policy analysis and as tools for early warning and preventive action.

Moderator

William Wood, Geographer, U.S. Department of State

Speakers

Lance Antrim, International Negotiating Systems

Chad McDaniel, Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland

John Davies, Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland

December 1, Dinner

**Perspectives on Diplomacy
in the Twenty-First Century**

Speaker

Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of State

4**about the Institute**

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan federal institution created and funded by Congress to strengthen the nation's capacity to promote the peaceful resolution of international conflict. Established in 1984, the Institute meets its congressional mandate through an array of programs, including grants, fellowships, conferences and workshops, library services, publications, and other educational activities. The Institute's Board of Directors is appointed by the President of the United States and confirmed by the Senate.

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